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Canada's anti-hate laws have recently attracted new attention from the
legal community and the public. Canada's Department of Revenue and Cus-
toms made headlines when it halted imports of Salman Rushdie's novel The
Satanic Verses to determine whether the book violated laws banning the dis-
semination of hate literature. The brief ban was lifted after the Canadian
government ruled the book was not hate propaganda.
The Canadian Supreme Court will soon review two of the anti-hate laws.
The Court has granted leave to appeal in Taylor and Western Guard Party
v. Canada Human Rights Commission and Regina v. Keegstra. The Taylor
case concerns hate messages communicated over the phone in violation of the
* This Article is an edited transcript of the discussion held on November 4, 1988 at the Law
School of the State University of New York at Buffalo as part of the James McCormick Mitchell
Lecture series. The colloquium was cosponsored by the Law School's Canadian-American Legal
Studies Committee, in cooperation with the SUNY at Buffalo Canadian-American Studies
Committee.
The Buffalo Law Review has attempted to adhere to Canadian conventions in citing Canadian
cases and statutes. Our thanks to David Schneiderman, research and field officer with the Canadian
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Canadian Human Rights Act. Keegstra, which was discussed extensively at
this November 1988 colloquium, involves a prosecution for promoting hatred
against an identifiable group in violation of the Canadian Criminal Code. 1
-THE EDITORS
IRGINIA LEARY: On behalf of the Law School, I would like to wel-
Come you to the annual Mitchell Lecture. The Law School is devel-
oping a Canadian focus in many areas-in environment, in trade, and in
dispute resolution, among others. The colloquium today on free speech
and group defamation is another opportunity to learn, and to exchange
with our Canadian colleagues. Four of our six speakers are from Canada.
I'm going to turn the program over to Professor Robert Berger, who
chairs the university-wide Canadian-American Studies Committee. He
will introduce the speakers and will moderate the program this after-
noon. Bob?
Robert Berger: Thank you Virginia. This colloquium will demon-
strate how much we as Americans can learn from studying Canadian
approaches to various issues-legal, as well as social and political and
cultural. Even though Canada and Canadians are, in many ways, much
like us in the U.S., in many ways-perhaps more than we sometimes
realize-they are a different and distinct people and nation. It can really
open our eyes to our own peculiarities to look to the Canadian approach
as we are doing today.
We've got a wonderfully knowledgeable panel of speakers with quite
divergent viewpoints and we will be beginning with our two featured
speakers. First will be Alan Borovoy, the long-time general counsel to
the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. He's the author of a new book
entitled When Freedoms Collide: The Case for Our Civil Liberties. Our
other featured speaker is Kathleen Mahoney, associate professor of law
at the University of Calgary in Alberta. She teaches, among other sub-
jects, human rights, and is coauthor of a new book, Equality and Judicial
Neutrality. After our two featured speakers, we will have the first of our
commentators, Jamie Cameron, associate professor of law at Osgoode
Hall Law School of York University in Toronto. She works and teaches
in U.S. and Canadian constitutional law. After that, we'll take a short
break, just to stretch, because we have a long program. We'll have a few
introductory remarks in the second half from Alan Freeman, who is a
professor of law here at Buffalo, and then begin with our two speakers
1. Taylor and Western Guard Party v. Canada Human Rights Comm., [1987] 3 F.C. 593, 37
D.L.R.(3d) 577 (Fed. C.A.); R. v. Keegstra (1988), 60 Alta. L.R.(2d) 1, 87 A.R. 177, 5 W.W.R. 211
(Alta. C.A.).
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from the United States. First will be Marl Matsuda, associate professor
of law at the University of Hawaii. She is currently engaged in a major
research project on the topic of racial hate messages. We will then move
on to David Goldberger, professor of law at Ohio State University Col-
lege of Law, who, in addition to writing in this area, was the lead counsel
in the American Civil Liberties Union case defending the right of the
neo-Nazis to demonstrate in Skokie. Finally, the one non-lawyer on our
panel is Barry Brown, a syndicated Canadian journalist who follows is-
sues that affect both Canada and the United States and serves, as he de-
scribes himself, as foreign correspondent in his own country. I expect this
to be quite a lively and illuminating colloquium, and I think we should
start right off. So, Alan Borovoy.
Alan Borovoy: It's with a certain amount of reluctance I confess to
you that I am the card-carrying general counsel of the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association. And a very jealous one at that. Would that one of
the candidates for prime minister had attacked our organization the way
one of the candidates for president attacked our counterpart; it would
have been worth a mint to us.
After all we've been through in this century, the kind of racist invec-
tive that still emerges in our two societies has to fill us with a sense of
outrage. Particularly after so many have suffered so much, to see people
having the gall to say, there was no Holocaust. It is understandable that
in all of us, in those of us who are civilized, there would be a very strong
impulse to suppress that kind of deeply offensive invective. But the issue
is, how do we square that with our commitment to freedom of speech?
Let me begin with the traditional disclaimer: freedom of speech is
not and cannot be an absolute. When I say this, I'm not only seeking to
disarm my adversaries, but also to force them to come up with more
compelling justifications for the various encroachments they seek to im-
pose on freedom of speech. As I acknowledge that freedom of speech is
not an absolute, I ask them to acknowledge that it is nevertheless the life
blood of the democratic system. It is a freedom that enables us to try to
persuade other people to our point of view-to try to marshal the sup-
port of others for the redress of our grievances. As a wise old trade
unionist once observed, freedom of speech is the grievance procedure of
the democratic system.
One of the critical questions that has to arise for those who wish to
suppress racist invective is, how are you going to formulate a prohibition
so precise that you will nail the racist invective you want to suppress
without incurring a terrific risk of catching, in the same net, all kinds of
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other speech which you must acknowledge it would be unconscionable
for a democratic society to suppress?
Let me tell you about the experience in Canada. I won't go through
all of the relevant legislation. I will take the most relevant, the law we
passed expressly to deal with these problems, our prohibition against
hate propaganda.2 It makes it an offense willfully to promote hatred
against people distinguished by race, religion, and ethnic origin. Hatred,
I suggest to you, is at best a very vague and imprecise word. If it had said
something like, it's an offense to incite violence against people on such
and such a basis in a situation where there is an imminent peril that the
incitement will be acted on, I don't think you would have gotten an argu-
ment from our organization. But when you talk about hatred, then we
open the floodgates. What does it mean? How far does it go? We know
that freedom of speech is sometimes most important, especially to ag-
grieved minorities, when it hurts, when it offends, when it creates dis-
quiet, when it creates discomfort. The late Martin Luther King, Jr.
described his own tactics as an exercise in creative tension. He knew he
had to upset people. How does a blunt instrument like the law, and par-
ticularly the criminal law, distinguish destructive hatred from construc-
tive tension? I have my doubts that it's possible to do so.
We've had this law for about twenty years. Let me look at the his-
tory of th6 last twenty years. On the streets of Toronto in the mid-1970s
you had some young people handing out leaflets at a visiting Shriners
Parade. The leaflets bore the words "Yankee Go Home." I hope that
isn't too unpopular a message here. And for that, they were arrested by
the police on a charge of distributing hate propaganda.' Now the prose-
cuting attorney had the good sense subsequently to withdraw the charge.
But I always hasten to tell people, particularly lawyers who measure
things too often in terms of judicial decisions and not enough in terms of
the actual experience of real people, don't derive too much consolation
from the fact that the charge didn't proceed. Those activists wound up
suffering the suppression of their legitimate protest, and they spent a
couple of days in jail.
In the mid-1970s we had a case that went all the way to court, an
2. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. 11, s. 281.2 (current version at R.S.C. 1985, c. C.42 s.
319.2), provides that communicating public statements that willfully promote hatred against certain
identifiable groups is an indictable offense, punishable by up to two years in prison. Another law
that has been used makes it a criminal act to willfully publish false news that is likely to harm the
public interest. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-42, s. 181.
3. See Hate Literature Charges Against 3 To Be Dropped, [Toronto] Globe and Mail, July 4,
1975, at 1; A Law Full of Dangers, [Toronto] Globe and Mail, July 2, 1975, at 6.
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absolutely bizarre case in Windsor, Ontario. Some French Canadians
were trying to attract money for French education, so they drafted and
distributed literature that was anti-French in the hope of creating pro-
French sympathy. You have to be a Philadelphia lawyer to figure that
out. They were charged and convicted in court of promoting hate propa-
ganda. It took a court of appeal judgment to throw it out.' I'm not sug-
gesting that those people or that absurd prank should have received a
medal. But they hardly represent the kind of persons"for whom this legis-
lation was designed.
And we've had official investigations conducted. A group of Arab
Canadians complained that Leon Uris's book The Haj maligned Arab
people. That forced an investigation into whether certain libraries should
be carrying it. No charge was laid. But why should those librarians, en-
gaged in support of that perfectly legitimate activity, have had to face
that kind of investigation? A film in support of Nelson Mandela was held
up at the border for more than one month on the grounds it might pro-
mote hatred against white South Africans.
If this isn't enough, I invite you to look at how we construe this
terminology in other contexts, because words like "hatred," "contempt,"
and "ridicule" have been in our legal system for quite some time. They
exist in our law dealing with criminal libel. At the end of the 1960s, the
editors of an underground newspaper were convicted-convicted-for
putting out an issue in which they purported to give a certain judge what
they called their Pontius Pilate award for justice.' A criminal offense in
Canada. And not long after that, a student wrote an article in a campus
newspaper which said that a certain trial was a mockery of justice and
the courts are instruments of the corporate elite. For that, he was
charged with and convicted of our offense of contempt of court by scan-
dalizing the courts.' He went to jail for ten days. Some of this is now
being challenged, especially under our new Canadian Charter. But I
mentioned this to give you an example of how words like hatred are sub-
ject to that kind of interpretation and application.
Now I know, from having debated with Kathleen so many times
and with others, that one of the arguments they often make is, we run
4. R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 101 D.L.R.(3d) 488 (Ont. H. Ct.), 49 C.C.C.(2d) 369
(Ont. C.A.).
5. R. v. Georgia Straight Publishing Ltd. (1970), 4 D.L.R.(3d) 383, [1970] 1 C.C.C. 94 (B.C. Co.
Ct.); see also Law Reform Commission of Canada, Defamatory Libel 17 (Working Paper 35) (Ot-
tawa: Supply and Services, 1984).
6. R. v. Murphy (1969), 4 D.L.R.(3d) 289, 1 N.B.R.(2d) 297 (N.B.S.C. App. Div.).
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that risk in all our laws; many of them contain a certain amount of im-
precision. Of course there's an element of truth in that. I suggest to you,
nevertheless, that terms like "hatred" tend to be far more imprecise than
many other terms we use in the law. Moreover, the other laws do not
involve a value as central to our society as freedom of speech. That's why
imprecision here is so much more unacceptable than it might be some-
where else. When I say this, I also have to argue with my lawyer friends
who will say, our Charter doesn't accord freedom of speech the same
status as the U.S. first amendment does. And I say, please spare me that.
My interest does not stop at the confines of the Bill of Rights or the
Charter of Rights. I say that in a democratic society, we still make policy
judgments and lawyers still have something to say, based on their experi-
ence and their expertise, about the wisdom of enacting laws that threaten
the grievance procedure of our society.
I also question how much laws like this actually contribute to the
interests of racial dignity. In many ways, the requirements of an anti-hate
prosecution violate the canons of common sense. From the standpoint of
common sense, I would have thought one of the things you don't do is
debate the merits of a malevolent obscenity. If I can quote Rabbi Gun-
ther Plaut of Toronto, "If someone calls your mother a whore, you don't
debate with him." But when you lay a criminal charge against someone,
you are often forced to confront seriously his various defenses. So in the
false news prosecution of hate-monger Ernst Zundel in Toronto, you had
a solemn debate about the monstrous proposition that Auschwitz was
not a Nazi death camp, but a Jewish country club.' And then you have a
prosecutor-not the defense, the prosecutor-call as a witness, a non-
Jewish banker and ask him if he was in the pay of an international Zion-
ist Communist Banker Jewish Freemason conspiracy. I'm not necessarily
criticizing the prosecutor. He felt he had to cover all the elements of the
accused's defense. What I'm suggesting, however, is that the risk of farce
is endemic to these kinds of proceedings. I hasten to point out, I am not
one of those who shrinks from these prosecutions because I'm afraid
these Nazis are going to gain such a following with their publicity and
notoriety that they'll become a serious force. That is not the reason. I
simply shrink from subsidizing the infliction on the public of a gratuitous
obscenity.
The question is often asked, why is it worth it? Why do we do it? In
7. R. v. Zundel (1987), 58 O.R.(2d) 129, 56 C.R.(3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused 61 O.R.(2d) 588n; see Prosecution in Zundel Trial Faced Long Odds, [Toronto] Globe and
Mail, Mar. 1, 1985, at 15.
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Canada, the rationale was spelled out by a special government committee
that was appointed in the sixties. It was called the Cohen Committee, a
very distinguished committee, which made recommendations on the ba-
sis of which our anti-hate law was enacted.8 And when I say distin-
guished-the chairman, Maxwell Cohen himself, was a law school dean,
and if that isn't enough to convince you he was distinguished, he also
became a judge on one of the international courts. The panel also had a
future minister of justice, Mark MacGuigan, who subsequently became a
judge of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada. It also had no less a
person than Pierre Elliot Trudeau, of whom I'm sure you've heard at
least a couple of things in the past. When they were setting out part of
the rationale why they wanted this law, they said that, although the
number of hate mongers in Canada is small, it's a clear and present dan-
ger. And why was it a clear and present danger? Because in times of
social stress, such hatred could mushroom into a real and monstrous
threat to our way of life. I would have thought that those two sentences
were inconsistent. I would have thought you could not say, that some-
thing is a clear and present danger, and, at some point could be a mon-
strous threat. I would have thought, at the very least, you could not
describe that as a present danger. Subsequently, courts in Canada have
split about upholding or striking down the anti-hate law. It hasn't yet
been ruled on by the Supreme Court of Canada, but some courts have
quoted those sentences with approval. Oliver Wendell Holmes must be
turning in his grave.
I am much more persuaded by other indicia. The first director of the
Ontario Human Rights Commission tells us, on the basis of all his expe-
rience, that Canadians are relatively immune to hate-mongering materi-
als. James Keegstra, the teacher who was prosecuted in Alberta for a
violation of the anti-hate law,9 ran as a candidate for the Social Credit
Party in the last federal election. Of the fifteen constituencies that party
contested, it ran last in eleven. In the other four, it just managed to
squeak by other aspirants for electoral oblivion, such as the Libertarian
Party, the Communist Party, and the official pranksters, the Rhinocerous
Party. The Social Credit Party got six-tenths of a percent of the popular
vote. Am I to believe that this is a sufficiently clear and present danger to
warrant the kind of threats to free speech and racial dignity that this law
creates? Invariably, I am met with the reply that Hitler started as a
8. Canada House of Commons, Report of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1966) (Chair: M. Cohen) [hereinafter Cohen Committee Report].
9. R. v. Keegstra, supra note 1.
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rather undistinguished paper hanger and look what happened. But those
who say this overlook the political differences between North America
and pre-Hitler Germany, and the legal similarities. Indeed, pre-Hitler
Germany had laws very much like our anti-hate law, and it was used
quite vigorously. I don't invoke an argument like that as a basis for my
case. I invoke it primarily to indicate that, even at best, these laws may
not be what some people crack them up to be.
Finally, I believe that we are not so devoid of ingenuity that we
cannot find other ways of containing the influences of hate mongers. As
for the nobodys, the peripheral creeps, those who have no standing in the
community-and that's most of them-we have very effectively con-
tained them by our general posture against the serious racial problems we
have: problems of discrimination in jobs, in housing, in public facilities.
Our program against racist deeds weakens the impact of racist words. It
creates a climate that makes it harder for the hate mongers to exert any
influence. But what about when some of them get a little closer to the
mainstream, as happened with Keegstra in Alberta? He was a teacher
and the mayor of a small community; that made him important. But
before the matter ever became public, he was removed from the class-
room. After it became public, he was decertified as a teacher and ousted
as a mayor. At that point, he should have been allowed to wallow in the
obscurity he so richly deserves.
I believe, therefore, that our anti-hate laws are too dangerous to
freedom of speech, create too many problems for racial dignity, and are
not needed to contain the influence of the hate mongers themselves. This
is not, of course, to discourage the fight against race hatred. It is only to
address the means for waging that fight. For these purposes, we should
seek, not to impose a legal muzzle, but rather to inflict political censure.
Such an approach cannot guarantee that we will find the right balance,
but alternative approaches can guarantee that we will find the wrong bal-
ance. Thank you very much.
Robert Berger: Thank you Alan. We certainly have the issue
presented well by Alan, and we're ready to have our second featured
speaker, Kathleen Mahoney.
Kathleen Mahoney: Thank you very much. I too, am very honored
to have been invited to speak with you. It's always very difficult to follow
such an eloquent speaker as Alan, with his humor, and his very interest-
ing, graphic examples of freedom of speech abuses. It's also almost irre-
sistibly tempting to depart from my script and specifically address the
points that he raises. However, I'm not going to do that. My task today is
[Vol. 37
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to try and explain the different constitutional approaches in Canada to
freedom of expression issues.
As a starting proposition, Canada and the United States agree that
freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Both countries accept that
there must be some laws to restrict expression which is seditious, defama-
tory, obscene, or which incites to violence or breach of the peace. There's
agreement that if society is to guarantee freedom of expression, some
restrictions may indeed be necessary to insure continued existence of the
society and its ability to protect its members. It's on the question of how
much authority is necessary that we differ. The Canadian governments
and courts draw the line on free speech differently than their American
counterparts, where group defamation or hate propaganda is involved.
The reasons for the difference, I will argue, are found in the politics
of civil liberties in Canada. In Canada, a stronger emphasis on collective
rights is emerging. Increasing recognition of the right of everyone to
equal treatment is apparent in legislation and case law, and there is grow-
ing acceptance of the view that an egalitarian society may be impossible
to achieve when the dissemination of racist ideas is permitted. Therefore,
the central thesis of my presentation is the changing nature of rights. I
believe liberty and equality are dynamic concepts. They embody values
which change with the times.
Although every society's constitution provides a statement of the
ideals it aspires to, it is the rights and freedoms actually enforced and
protected that reveal the social and political realities of that society. This
is especially true where "ideal" goals within the same constitutional in-
strument come into fundamental conflict with each other, as the goals of
equality and liberty often do. Constitutional goals can also clash with
other social interests such as the public order, community interests, and
stability in the population. How a society applies its constitutional goals
to the reality of changing social and economic conditions, tells us a lot
about its politics of civil liberties.
In Canada, the politics of civil liberties are gradually changing,
evolving toward a more egalitarian society. Historically discriminated-
against groups in Canada are not only demanding the opportunities, ben-
efits, and rights which those in the mainstream have always enjoyed, they
are beginning to define rights in their own way, based on their life exper-
iences. Freedom of speech as defined by women and minority groups
looks different than freedom of speech defined by others. They look at
freedom of expression in terms of the liberal ideal and ask, does this
make us free? Do we have the same freedom of speech that the dominant
1988/89]
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elite have? How would regulation of some forms of speech affect that
allocation? They wonder how something experienced by one person can
be called freedom, when it is simultaneously experienced by another as
violence, oppression, containment, or some other variation of non-free-
dom.' 0 They challenge a concept of freedom which allows hate mongers
and pornographers to attack and destroy their constitutional rights with
impunity.
These same arguments have been made, perhaps louder and longer,
in the United States than in Canada-yet it is in Canada that changes in
the concepts of liberty and equality are more visible. This can be ex-
plained in terms of our different civil liberties politics, which are deter-
mined by a number of factors, including history, the structures of our
governments, political processes, social realities, and of course, the con-
tent of our constitutional instruments and the judicial interpretation of
them.
Canada, unlike the U.S., came into existence without war or revolu-
tion. Links with our motherland remain strong, the important conse-
quence being that the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy is a
central feature of our government. When Parliament is supreme, it is the
government which has the primary responsibility for balancing liberty
claims against competing claims. Because of this tradition, Canadians
have historically trusted government authority more than Americans
have, the dominant view being that the weighing process is better
thrashed out in the administrative and legislative processes than in the
courts. 1 Until 1982, when our Charter of Rights and Freedoms 2 came
into effect, civil liberties in Canada were enhanced and protected by the
courts only as an incidental outcome of constitutional litigation on divi-
sion of powers. When overzealous provincial governments tried to legis-
late in the federal realm in ways harmful to minority interests, their laws
more often than not were struck down-not because they violated rights
and freedoms-but on jurisdictional grounds of the division of powers
between the two levels of government.
In sociological terms, Canada and the United States share some of
the same problems of heterogeneity of population, of language differ-
10. Lahey, The Charter and Pornography: Toward a Restricted Theory of Constitutionally Pro.
tected Expression, in LITIGATING THE VALUES OF A NATION 287 (J. Weiler & R. Elliott eds. 1986).
11. Westin, The United States Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter: A Socio-Political Analy
sis, in THE U.S. BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (W.
McKeacher ed. 1983).
12. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched.
ule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c.1 1 [hereinafter Charter].
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ences, and of original native population. In this dimension, definition and
reconciliation of minority rights have been central to civil liberties poli-
tics in both our countries. But major differences exist in legal and consti-
tutional treatment. One major ideological difference is Canada's rejection
of the melting pot approach to cultural diversity adopted in the U.S. in
favor of a mosaic approach. One of the objectives of the drafters of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms was to develop a bilingual and multicul-
tural country and a pluralistic mosaic. 3
Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to both provincial
and federal governments and guarantees fundamental freedoms, demo-
cratic rights, legal rights, equality rights, mobility rights, and language
rights. Its commitments are different in many respects from the commit-
ments of the American Bill of Rights. The multicultural section is a case
in point. 4 Section 27 of our Charter states that the Charter shall be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhance-
ment of the multicultural heritage of Canadians. 5 This provision is par-
ticularly important when courts are required to balance the freedom of
expression of hate propagandists against the multiculturalism ideal, espe-
cially when read with the powerful equality provision. Section 15(1) of
the Charter demonstrates Canada's very strong commitment to equality.
It not only guarantees equal protection of the law, like the American
Constitution, it also guarantees equality before and under the law and
equal benefit of the law without discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability. 6
It is thus, much broader in scope than the fourteenth amendment, having
wider substantive protections as well as more prohibited grounds of dis-
crimination. Section 15(2) of the Charter expressly adds a clause which
legitimizes affirmative action in the constitutional definition of equality
rights.1 7 When Section 15 is read with the multiculturalism section, it
13. Minutes of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Con-
stitution of Canada (1972) Rec. 3. The minutes state that the purpose of a multicultural provision
would be, "To develop Canada as a bilingual and multicultural country in which all its citizens, male
and female, young and old, native peoples and m&is, and all groups from ethnic origin feel equally at
home."
14. Charter, s. 27.
15. Ibid.
16. Charter, s. 15(1), states: "Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability."
17. Charter, s. 15(2) states that s. 15(1) does not preclude laws designed to ameliorate conditions
of disadvantaged groups and individuals.
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creates a formidable obstacle against those who would use the freedom of
expression guarantee to promote hatred against identifiable groups.
Sex equality guarantees are similarly strengthened by Section 28
which states, "Notwithstanding, anything in this Charter, the rights and
freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female per-
sons." 18 This section requires a sex equality approach be taken with re-
spect to expression which undermines sex equality guarantees.
In a recent pornography case, the British Columbia Court of Ap-
peals cited Section 28 with Section 15 as its reason for upholding Crimi-
nal Code obscenity provisions notwithstanding the freedom of expression
guarantees.19 The court said that if true equality is to be achieved be-
tween male and female persons, society must guard against misogynist
materials which encourage sexual violence and discrimination against
women. This reasoning was very similar to the trial decision in the Keeg-
stra case that Alan has already discussed,20 and the Court of Appeal de-
cision in the Andrews case,2 1 both of which addressed the incitement to
hatred provision. In both cases, the multicultural provision was used to
buttress the finding that either the promotion of hatred provisions in the
Criminal Code, do not violate the Charter's guarantee of freedom of ex-
pression or hate propaganda laws are reasonable limits, demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.22
The other minority interests protected in the Charter-including
language and education rights, aboriginal rights, and rights for denomi-
national separate or dissentient schools-underline the strong commit-
ment to collective rights in the Charter which is not evident in the
American Constitution.
A further difference between our two constitutions is the express
standard in the Charter for judging limits on rights. Section 1 states that
the rights and freedoms in the Charter are guaranteed, but may be sub-
ject to reasonable limits prescribed by law which can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.23 Because of Section 1, a very
careful balancing of interests is required when rights conflict. No hierar-
18. Charter, s. 28.
19. R. v. Red Hot Video Ltd. (1985), 18 C.C.C.(3d) 1, 45 C.R.(3d) 36 (B.C.C.A.).
20. R. v. Keegstra, supra note 1.
21. R. v. Andrews and Smith (1988), 65 O.R.(2d) 161, 28 O.A.C. 161 (Ont. C.A.).
22. Charter, s. 1. At trial, Justice Quigley used both reasons in the Keegstra decision. The major-
ity of the Ontario Court of Appeals found that freedom of expression does not give constitutional
protection to hate mongering. The minority concluded that freedom of expression was limited by the
hate propaganda law, but it is a reasonable limit within s.l of the Charter.
23. Ibid.
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chy of rights is created in our constitution, contrary to what Alan would
have you believe. To determine if a limit on a right or freedom is reason-
able and demonstrably justified, two major factors are examined. First,
the purpose of the limit must be an important one. Second, the means
chosen to carry out that purpose must be rationally connected to it and
limit the rights or freedom as little as possible. There must be proportion-
ality between the effects of the limit and the desired result.
Now that all sounds rather complicated, so I'm going to use an ex-
ample to show you how the different values come into play in the Section
1 balancing process. Let's take the most controversial of the hate propa-
ganda laws-the Criminal Code section that prohibits the willful promo-
tion of hatred against an identifiable group,2' not requiring a breach of
the peace.
In the Section 1 constitutional balancing process, the Crown must
show that the crime of promoting hatred against identifiable groups can
pass the purpose test. Since the hate law was designed to protect consti-
tutionally entrenched equality rights of minority groups, as well as the
multicultural nature of Canadian society, it prima facie has an important
purpose. The Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the importance of hate
laws when it said that multiculturalism cannot be preserved, let alone
enhanced, if free reign is given to the promotion of hatred against identi-
fiable cultural groups. The Court said it would be strange and perverse
contradiction if the Charter were used to strike down a law aimed at
preserving our multicultural heritage by limiting in a minimal and rea-
sonable way, freedom of expression.25
In addition to this purpose within Canada, external obligations pro-
vide another important purpose for the limits. The international commu-
nity has long recognized the evil inherent in the promotion of hatred
against identifiable groups. As a signatory to the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,26 Canada
is required to prohibit, as a matter of law, the dissemination of hate prop-
aganda. If Canada were to decide free speech is more important than the
24. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. 11, s. 281.2 (current version at R.S.C. 1985, c.c-42,
s. 319.2).
25. R. v. Andrews and Smith, supra note 21. The Report of the Special Committee on Hate
Propaganda underlines this. After a careful study, the Committee reported to Parliament that the
Canadian community has a duty-not merely a right-to protect itself from the corrosive effects of
propaganda which tends to undermine the confidence that various groups in a multicultural society
must have in each other. See Cohen Committee Report, supra note 8.
26. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
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intentional incitement of racial, ethnic, and religious hatred, it would
breach its international obligations and undermine its international stat-
ure and reputation.
It can be further argued that the purpose test is satisfied because in
addition to protecting societal interests from harm, law against hate
propaganda serves the important purpose of preventing harm to the tar-
get group. The Law Reform Commission of Canada in its 1986 paper
Hate Propaganda, cited the inhumane practices of totalitarian regimes,
particularly the Third Reich, as reason to set general speech standards
for the respect of persons and minorities.27 The Commission said it is
important to remember how repetition of hate propaganda by the Nazis
led in rapid succession to the breaking of shop windows of Jewish
merchants, to the seizure of their property, to the expulsion of Jews from
their professions, to the establishment of concentration camps, and fi-
nally, to the gas chambers. In view of Hitler's successful use of hate prop-
aganda to drive reason from the field, the Commission took the view that
absolute faith in a rational, free marketplace of ideas was not only wrong-
headed, but irresponsible. Evidence of real harm caused to Jews and
others by the racist regime of the Third Reich demonstrates how target
groups can be hurt physically and emotionally by hate propaganda.
The second branch of the balancing process is the means chosen
test. It requires an examination of the way freedom of expression is cur-
tailed, to see whether there is some balance between the limitation of the
speech and the reason for limiting it. The means chosen here, the hate
propaganda laws which prohibit the willful promotion of hatred against
identifiable groups, is a criminal law. It is obviously rationally connected
to the objective of protecting groups from racial hatred, but is the law too
broad? The elements of the offense of the willful promotion of hatred are
that the accused must communicate the statement publicly, and there
must be an intention on the part of the accused to incite hatred.28 It is
clear that the law is not intended to prohibit anything but extreme forms
of speech. Mere contentious, irritating, and annoying speech would not
meet the criteria of that section. The scope then of the hate law is limited
to public communication which must be made with the intention of pro-
moting hatred.
A further step in examining the means chosen, is to look at what
defenses are available to an accused. For the crime of inciting hatred
27. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Hate Propaganda (Ottawa: 1986) (working paper 50).
28. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. 11, s. 281.2 (current version at R.S.C. 1985, c.c-42,
s. 319.2).
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against an identifiable group, an accused cannot be convicted if he estab-
lishes any one of the following defenses: that the statements he commu-
nicated were true; if what he expressed was intended to establish an
opinion on a religious subject; if the statements were relevant to any sub-
ject of public interest, the discussion of which was for the public benefit
and, if on reasonable grounds he believed them to be true; and if in good
faith he intended to point out for the purpose of removing them, matters
producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an identifiable
group in Canada.29
The defenses taken with the intent requirements show that the hate
propaganda law is narrow in scope. Perhaps it could be made narrower.
However, I'm arguing more for its existence rather than its perfection.
Whether the law is narrow enough will soon be decided by the Supreme
Court of Canada. Two provincial courts of appeal presently disagree on
this point. In the Keegstra case, the Alberta Court of Appeal found the
law overly broad, whereas the Ontario Court of Appeal in the Andrews
case did not. The court in the Keegstra case30 took what I would call an
American approach. It looked for clear and present danger or actual
harm to justify the law. Some sort of crisis would be required before the
proportionality test could be satisfied. The court failed to give any weight
to competing constitutional rights. Instead, it trivialized them, stating
Section 15 and Section 27 of the Charter do not forbid Canadians from
disagreeing with the ideas they contained. The court added that real
harm to the target group such as social ostracization, alienation, and
wide-spread acceptance of the message, would be required to make a hate
law constitutional. A threat of harm would not be sufficient. The court
in Andrews,3 on the other hand, upheld the hate propaganda law. It
pointed to other Criminal Code offenses, such as attempted murder and
driving with a blood-alcohol content of over 80 mg., which exist to pre-
vent threatened or potential harm. Justice Cory (as he then was) pointed
out that the very basis for the existence of the offense of driving over 80
mg. is founded on empirical data as to the danger that people driving a
motor vehicle with such a blood alcohol count constitute to members of
the public. He felt the empirical data from the history of the Third Reich
and the studies of the Cohen Committee are entitled to the same weight.
Not only does that data establish the risk of harm to identifiable groups
by the promotion of hatred, but the actual harm caused. He concluded
29. Ibid. s. 281.2(3) (current version at s. 319.2(3)).
30. R. v. Keegstra, supra note 1.
31. R. v. Andrews and Smith, supra note 21.
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that immediate harm was not required to uphold the anti-hate law. The
Andrews court also found the law narrow in scope, particularly because
of the defenses open to the accused.
In my opinion, theAndrews approach is the better one. It referred to
competing rights and national multicultural goals in conjunction with
freedom of expression, and recognized that expression which instills en-
mity and detestation does "incalculable damage to the Canadian commu-
nity and lays the foundations for the mistreatment of members of the
victimized groups." In its recognition of competing equality rights, the
Andrews court gives substance and meaning to our legal egalitarian val-
ues similar to the Supreme Court's approach in the Morgentaler case,32
the Canadian equivalent of Roe v. Wade.3" Madame Justice Wilson rec-
ognized the struggle women have had in defining their own rights. She
said that the history of the struggle for human rights from the eighteenth
century on has been the history of men struggling to assert their dignity
and common humanity against an overbearing state apparatus. The more
recent struggle for women's rights has been a struggle to eliminate dis-
crimination, to achieve a place for women in a man's world, to develop a
set of legislative reforms to place women in the same position as men. She
continues that women's needs and aspirations are only now being trans-
lated into protective rights. 4
This same approach must be considered in minority rights cases
where hate propaganda is an issue. With the Charter, a new dimension or
yardstick of reconciliation was created between the individual and the
community, and their respective rights. It would be unfortunate if the
Charter were used as a shield for racists, protecting the dissemination of
hate propaganda rather than protecting against it. If hate propaganda is
permitted under the flagship of freedom of expression, racial incitement
and the practice of race discrimination turns into a legal entitlement.
Until recently, only the dominant elite championed the rights of free
speech. Now women and minority groups in Canada have served notice
that they will fight for their own concepts of equal rights and freedoms.
The ultimate answer is, time will tell. Every society gets the kind of civil
liberties politics that its social realities and political systems deserve and
dictate. The Canadian ethic is one of egalitarianism, and it is one we
deserve and I hope our system can deliver it. We have the tools to do it.
We have a Charter unique in free societies of the world. It requires bal-
32. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 37 C.C.C.(3d) 449.
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. R. v. Morgentaler, supra note 32, at 36.
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ance. It provides a careful mechanism. I think we can do it, and I cer-
tainly think we should try.
Robert Berger: Thank you Kathleen. We have the issues well
presented at this point, and Jamie Cameron will now speak.
Jamie Cameron: Thank you. I'd like to begin with four propositions.
I hope you'll forgive me if they seem trite, but they are truisms of Ameri-
can constitutional culture, and therefore provide the foundation for what
I will refer to as First Amendment Romanticism.
Proposition Number One is this: there can be no liberty without a
constitution. When I use the word constitution, of course, I'm necessarily
including its institutional props, the Bill of Rights and judicial review.
The following statement was made in 1799: "American students should
be taught to love and admire our present excellent constitution and to
believe that with its destruction, will perish the remains of all liberty in
the world."35 I believe that Americans accept that view as much today as
they might have back then. This leads to Proposition Number Two: lib-
erty under the Constitution cannot exist without freedom of speech.
Thus, we have the famous words of Justice Holmes in dissent in United
States v. Schwimmer, "[I]f there is any principle of the constitution that
more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle
of free thought. . . ."I' These words were developed a few years later by
Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, where he referred to freedom of
thought as the matrix and indispensable condition of nearly every other
form of freedom.37 To summarize to this point, Dogma Number One
asserts that liberty requires a constitution. And Dogma Number Two
asserts that constitutional liberty requires freedom of expressions.
Propositions Three and Four are required by Propositions One and
Two. Proposition Three is this: because liberty requires a constitution,
and because constitutional liberty requires freedom of expression, the
first amendment must be given a purist and almost absolute interpreta-
tion. Hence, part two of Holmes's reasoning in Schwimmer, where he
said that if the first amendment means anything, it means that we must
respect the thought we hate as much, if not more, than the thought we
35. Letter from B. Rush to J. Montgomery (June 21, 1799), reprinted in 2 THE LETTERS OF
BENJAMIN RUSH 812 (1951), noted in M. KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF 77
(1986).
36. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (defending
right of pacifist to become naturalized citizen).
37. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (holding Connecticut statute
which permitted criminal appeals to be taken by the state is not a violation of the double jeopardy
clause embodied in the fifth amendment).
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love.38 Not only do Americans tolerate speech they hate, they tolerate
speech they hate on the subjects that are of the greatest importance to
them. As Justice Jackson put it in another famous case, the freedom to
differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a
mere shadow of freedom, he said. The test of its substance is the right to
differ on things that touch the heart of the existing order.39 That, Ameri-
cans have been told time and time again, is the theory of the constitution.
Proposition Number Four simply reveals the results of all the foregoing:
the Constitution makes Liberty safest in America, Americans the freest
of all people, and most important, the most tolerant of all people.
Those are my four propositions. They lead to what I have already
referred to as First Amendment Romanticism. I'll only identify three ele-
ments of First Amendment Romanticism. There are probably others.
First is the idea that protecting freedom of expression is an act of cour-
age. As Justice Brandeis tells us in Whitney v. California,40 those who
won your independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not
fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. They
were courageous, self-reliant men who understood that it is the function
of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.
Second, protecting freedom of expression is also a testament to de-
mocracy in America. Americans will often tell you that, unlike other
countries which are not mature enough, which are less stable, less com-
mitted to democracy-unlike those other countries, America does not
find it necessary to suppress freedom of expression. Why? Because, as
Justice Jackson put it,
[A]ssurance that rights are secure tends to diminish fear and jealousy of
strong government, and by making us feel safe to live under it, makes for its
better support. To enforce those rights today is not to choose weak govern-
ment over strong government. It is only to adhere as a means of strength to
individual freedom of mind ......
This brings me to the third element of First Amendment Romanti-
cism, which is the idea that protecting freedom of speech shows the tri-
umph of reason over belief. Freedom of expression requires a
commitment to the power of reason.4" This is an expression used by Jus-
tice Brandeis, once again in Whitney v. California. To believe otherwise,
38. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 655.
39. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (invalidating
mandatory flag salute).
40. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
41. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 636, 637.
42. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.
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Americans tell themselves, is to make an unflattering estimate of the ap-
peal of their institutions to free minds. Thus the price of free speech is a
small one, the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes,
and the remedy is an easy one. The remedy is more speech, not less. 3
Americans have convinced themselves that when the United States
Constitution protects freedom of expression, it does so as an act of cour-
age, it does so because of the strength of American constitutional democ-
racy, and it does so because of faith in the power of reason. But if this is
what it's all about, why did the Supreme Court of Illinois claim in the
Skokie cases' that U.S. Supreme Court decisions "compel us to permit
the demonstrations,"45 and that "[w]e reluctantly conclude that the dis-
play of the swastika cannot be enjoined." 46 You would find similar lan-
guage in the federal circuit court opinion.' This might not strike
everybody as an act of judicial courage. It could hardly be said that the
expression in question reinforced democratic institutions by making Sko-
kie citizens feel safer in their country of choice. It makes no apparent
appeal to the power of reason and seems rather to appeal to the power of
intimidation.
This leads me to conclude that, when the rhetorical facade is
stripped away, there's really only one explanation for the extremism of
first amendment doctrine: Americans believe that it is the necessary in-
terpretation of the first amendment. Americans claim that it is an either/
or situation: a choice between insidious censorship or freedom of
thought. And they chose freedom of thought. To illustrate, I'll just give
one example. Forgive my penchant for quotations; I use them because I
like to think that the best way to unsettle Americans is to quote them to
themselves. This time it is Justice Black quoting Thomas Jefferson:
"I deplore ... the putrid state into which our newspapers have passed, and
the malignity, the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those who write
them. These ordures are rapidly depraving the public taste.
"It is however an evil for which there is no remedy, our liberty de-
pends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being
43. Id. at 641.
44. The Skokie Cases litigated the American Nazi Party's constitutional right to demonstrate in
an Illinois suburb inhabited primarily by Jewish persons, many of whom were Holocaust survivors
or relatives of Holocaust victims. At the end of the litigation, the neo-Nazis' first amendment right
was vindicated, despite the severe psychic harm residents of Skokie would have suffered. The compli-
cated history of the Skokie Cases is summarized in Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69
Ill.2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
45. Id. at 612, 373 N.E.2d at 23.
46. Id. at 619, 373 N.E.2d at 26.
47. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir. 1978).
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lost." 48
Cannot is the word he used. Why not?
Americans still embrace an eighteenth century conception of human
nature and the state. In this world, society is perceived as hostile and
humankind as self-interested and aggressive. Individuals seek to assert
dominion over other individuals, and the state seeks to assert dominion
over everybody. At the micro level, individuals fear and distrust each
other, and at the macro level, they fear and distrust the state. This is both
a distinctive and pervasive element in American constitutional culture,
and indeed it may be most deeply entrenched at this point in time in the
jurisprudence of the first amendment. This results in a requirement of
extreme egalitarianism between different types of speech because every-
thing else, according to Americans, is censorship. So when Americans
talk about protecting speech as an act of courage born of strength, belief
in democratic institutions and the power of reason, I don't quite believe
them. These principles seem as much about fear as courage, and more
about moral agnosticism than about participatory democracy or the tri-
umph of reason.
I want to conclude with two quotations which speak very percep-
tively to this whole aspect of first amendment jurisprudence. The first is
by Max Lerner, and this is the observation he made a long time ago
about the nature of American constitutional culture. He said, "We are, in
a sense, a barbaric people, only several generations removed from the
wilderness psychology. The whole development of American life has
been riddled with violence .... We live in a jungle of fear of such vio-
lence, and our exaggerated lip service to 'law and order' and our cult of
judges are functions of that fear."49 He went on to say, "The ultimate
power of the Supreme Court and the Constitution... comes from what
is, in the last analysis, the strongest support any institution or tradition
can have-namely, fear... I mean the fear of not having the Court and
the Constitution to fall back upon ... For it is fear and not will which
underlies a good part of our politics-the creeping fear of people who do
not want to make decisions, and prefer to surrender their decisions to
others."50 Hence, the futile plea of a Frankfurter who complained of
America's constant preoccupation with the constitutionality of legisla-
tion rather than with its wisdom,5 and consequently, the preoccupation
48. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 250, 270 n.16 (1941).
49. Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1311 (1937) (note omitted).
50. Id. at 1316.
51. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 670 (dissenting).
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of the American mind with a false value. The end of the American phase
of this comment is that the first amendment is not all about sweetness
and light. Paradoxically, it's just as much about fear and loathing. 2
Now let me pick on Canada for a minute. Fortunately I can do that
much more briefly. Unlike Americans, we do not live in obsessive fear of
the state. Instead, we live in obsessive fear of the United States. We don't
lack confidence in the viability of parliamentary institutions. We lack
confidence in our viability as a nation. We continue to manifest a deep-
seated, profoundly felt and often irrational fear of the Americans. Curi-
ously, however, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms may well end up
being a greater threat to our cultural integrity than the free trade agree-
ment. But, largely because of the romanticism surrounding a self-impor-
tant role for the individual, the Charter is not portrayed as such.
Having said that, after years of training in the classroom, I have
mastered the technique of being able to confuse my audience and come
up with what I think might be a fairly unpredictable conclusion. Despite
what I said about American constitutional culture and the first amend-
ment, I believe that our hate literature provisions in Canada may be un-
constitutional. Prohibiting hate literature requires two things: first of all,
that collective values prevail over individualist values; and second, per-
haps more important in the context of the first amendment, that belief
wins out over reason. It's my view that hate literature can only be banned
as a matter of belief- subjective belief, subjective perception-that it is
wrong.
Prior to the Charter, the political community in Canada decided, as
a matter of belief, as a matter of judgment, as a matter of political re-
sponsibility, that hate literature is wrong, bad, and intolerable. However,
when we acquired fundamental rights, what had previously been a matter
of belief and collective values all at once became an abstraction, a legal
principle, a question of reason. The American orthodoxy that there are
no lines between censorship and freedom is not without foundation in a
legal or constitutional regime. The problem is not that the lines can't be
drawn, the problem is the lines cannot be defended. I have reluctantly
concluded that this is an unavoidable result. Freedom of speech is pro-
tected as an instrument of reason. I don't especially believe that is the
reality, but I very definitely believe that is the constitutional rationale,
the underlying rationale that supports freedom of expression as a legal
52. Timing and forum constraints have forced me to be provocative at the expense of being
persuasive. The ideas in this presentation are being developed in an Article provisidnally titled Real-
ism, Formalism, and First Amendment Romanticism.
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concept. Abstract reason cannot distinguish between different types of
expression. Why not? Because whether speech is right or wrong, good or
bad, is a matter of perception, belief, persuasion, not logic. If the purpose
of a constitution is to protect ideas from popular belief, the state cannot
declare certain types of speech unconstitutional because they are unrea-
sonable. It is prohibited from doing what was a matter of course prior to
the Charter because the nature of the question has changed; it has be-
come a question of principle, of abstraction, of legal reasoning.
That change in the texture of the issue precludes the conclusion that
freedom of expression can be prohibited simply because it is unreasona-
ble or wrong. As Justice Rehnquist said in Arnett v. Kennedy, 3 at a cer-
tain point in time, people must realize that sometimes they have to take
the bitter with the sweet. I have very mixed views about the Charter. In
the case of the Charter and hate literature, I would turn Justice Rehn-
quist's expression around and say that here, it may be a question of tak-
ing the bitter with the bitter. Thank you very much.
Robert Berger: We have much more to come in both the U.S. and
Canadian contexts. Indeed, we might even get the answer to the question,
why would anybody mention Geraldo Rivera's name in this context? But
why don't we take a ten minute stretch and then we'll pick up again.
Alan Freeman: OK, I've got to kick off round two. Taking the path
of extreme and perhaps tongue-in-cheek understatement, I would suggest
that just about everybody in this room would agree that Canada is no less
civilized than the United States. Given that, we have just heard what is
an on-going lively debate in Canada over the punishability of hate
messages. To be sure there is a debate, and there are two credible posi-
tions at issue. In the United States, a similar debate would have been
regarded as unthinkable until very recently. The idea that we could pun-
ish such material would have been met immediately by, "The first
amendment would not allow that," end of discussion, gone. Over the last
couple of years, though, an American version of the debate has suddenly
developed. We are taking these issues seriously, and the next two speak-
ers will be kind of a moment in a new and on-going American counter-
part of the Canadian debate.
That the debate is happening these days in this country is not merely
academic. What is happening is an increasing, rising, cumulative out-
break of virulent racism. That's the reality out there. Just this past Mon-
53. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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day in the New York Times, October 31, there was yet another report of
racism on the campuses. Campuses are where we think tolerance and
diversity would be promoted, not the scene of increasing epithets, slo-
gans, scrawled symbols- directed at Black people, at feminists, at Jews.
It's happening more and more, and the question is, can we do something
about it? Let's hear from the speakers.
Robert Berger: With that, we'll begin with Mari Matsuda.
Mari Matsuda: Thank you. I'd like to thank all of you at Buffalo,
and especially the students, for attending today. This is such an impor-
tant topic, and I'm excited to see intellectual and political debate on this
issue. It's also a privilege to appear with our neighbors from Canada. For
a long time, Canada has served as the conscience of North America,
from the days of slavery through Vietnam to the present. We've always
looked north for guidance on issues that we in this country have been less
able to rise to. So it's an honor to appear with Canadians and to hear the
lively debate that's coming from that country.
I start with the premise that I am a lawyer. I am a member of the
American Civil Liberties Union. I took an oath to uphold and defend the
Constitution. I believe in the Bill of Rights. I also believe that there
should be legal limitations on misogynist and racist hate speech in this
country. 4 That may strike some people as a paradox. The last time I
spoke on this issue, someone came up to me afterwards and said, "I never
thought I would see the day when a lawyer would say the things that
you're saying." But my position is that you can be a lawyer, you can be
committed to the concept of rights, and particularly to the values of the
first amendment, and still recognize the need to limit racist hate speech. I
come to that position in part as a woman and as a person of color, influ-
enced by the new jurisprudence that's coming from our communities-
the feminist jurisprudence, critical jurisprudence, and jurisprudence of
people of color that recognizes that there are different ways to look at
law and legal theory. Some of this jurisprudence, for instance, recognizes
the need to look at history, to look at individual experience, to look at
context in analyzing the effects of the laws that we promulgate. We
should recognize the effects of those laws on groups of people and on
communities of people, not just on individuals. We need to reevaluate the
concept of rights and the concept of equality to recognize the needs of
oppressed communities in our country. How may we do that?
54. A f6rmal exposition of this position is forthcoming in Public Sanction of Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv (Aug.).
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I use the principal of equality as a starting point. And I respectfully
disagree with my colleague from the Canadian Civil Liberties Associa-
tion. I think the first amendment and the concept of free speech is an
important one, but if I were to give primacy to any one right, and if I
were to create a hierarchy, I would put equality first, because the right of
speech is meaningless to people who do not have equality. I mean sub-
stantive as well as procedural equality. I don't know much about your
community, but I would guess that you have homeless people, that you
have poor people, that you have people of color, to whom the right of
freedom of speech is relatively meaningless. Until we are able to bring
our brothers and sisters to some level of equality where they can partici-
pate equally in the political process, rights like free speech are going to
remain relatively meaningless to them.
The values at the heart of the first amendment are the values of
personhood-that each human being is special and deserves a place in
this society in their beliefs and their personal consciousness. From that
value I derive my position that we need to limit hate speech.
I had the experience of arriving in Perth, Australia to find the entire
city plastered with large posters that said, in very graphic, bold lettering:
"Asians Out or Racial War." It was interesting to me to see my own
response. The first response was, of course, a real fear response, the body
preparing for a fight. But then some very strange things happened in my
mind. I started thinking, they don't mean me, they mean those other
Asians, those immigrants, the Hong Kong people. Of course, that's not
true. Racists do not make subtle distinctions between native-born Ameri-
cans and immigrant Asians. Or Japanese or Chinese. Racism is racism.
And they do mean me.
The other thing I found going on in my own psychology was that all
my interactions with white people from then on were colored by the fact
that this hate speech existed in the town. I found myself being super
polite, using an educated inflection so that people wouldn't confuse me
with those "other" Asians. If people were rude to me, I had to stop and
think, now is this plain old ordinary rudeness or is this racism? A whole
layer of junk colored all my normal interactions with other human be-
ings. I think that the same process in a different way goes on for domi-
nant group members. For instance, white people may feel the need to be
extra polite, so that people know that they're not the people who are
putting up those signs. Or white people may feel a moment of relief that
they are not the target, even as they reject the speech. I know, for in-
stance, that when I get anti-Semitic literature, two things go on: one,
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anger, and two, a moment when I think, it's not me, thank God. Then I
have to reject that and say no. An attack on any people because of their
ethnicity, their religion, their race, is an attack on me. But there is that
secret guilty moment of gratitude that one is not the victim. This is an-
other insidious way in which this kind of speech destroys normal rela-
tions and normal social interaction between groups.
The other thing that goes on, is that when this forbidden, hateful,
evil, ugly idea is planted in our minds, we're forced to constantly reject it.
You can't not think about it, so that when you interact with a person that
is a member of the target group, the idea comes into the mind and then it
must be rejected. That is a real social harm with real social effects. Those
are some of the subtler costs. The more obvious costs are reported in the
literature. In the San Francisco fire department, people come to work
and there's a swastika on their desks. In Florida, a black woman comes
to work and is constantly harassed with KKK literature from her col-
leagues. A noose hangs over her desk one morning. People pay a real
price for this. The woman who found the noose hanging over her desk
eventually had a nervous breakdown and had to seek psychiatric
treatment.
So I start from the premise that there is a harm, and the choice to
completely ignore that harm and to refuse to recognize it as a counter-
vailing principle when we do the first amendment analysis reinforces ra-
cism. How then can we develop a new first amendment jurisprudence
that acknowledges the harm and yet remains true to the principles of the
first amendment and free speech? I'd like to commend my colleagues
who appear today taking a strong first amendment position, because I
know that position is not taken without cost. And I will use a little First
Amendment Romanticism and say that I do commend the lawyers who
are fighting for free speech in this country, in this particular context,
because there is a heavy price to pay for that. I think it is an act of
courage, as much as I disagree with the position. I do think that we need
to take a strong stand for free speech and against censorship. How can
we do that and at the same time limit hate speech?
My suggestion is that we should define very narrowly the kind of
speech that we intend to limit and that we should define it on the basis of
content. That is, I think, heresy in first amendment doctrine. But in the
long run we remain truer to the protection of political speech if we look
candidly at the content of this hate speech that we intend to limit. I
would propose three markers for identifying the kind of speech that
should be limited. The first is speech that advocates the inherent superi-
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ority of one group of human beings over another. The second is speech
directed at an historically oppressed group. Third is speech that uses the
language of hatred, degradation, and persecution. It's very close to the
Canadian position. The only addition I would make is that we want to
get away from neutral application of this law and really say that what
we're after is the most dangerous kind of speech, speech that's directed
against historical victim groups. We need to use our historical
knowledge.
We cannot deny the reality of racism as a historical factor in this
country and on this planet. We cannot deny the intersection of racism
and violence, particularly in this country. And we can't deny the fact
that we fought wars and resolved some of these issues. Two the bloodiest
wars of this country's history, the Civil War and World War II, had at
the core a decision to reject the idea of racial supremacy. Historical
memory is important. I think we've taken a pledge to remember the Hol-
ocaust. And we've taken a vow that it will never happen again. We can
say that we have made collective human progress on this promise. We
can reject the idea of racial supremacy, deny that it is an idea that be-
longs in the marketplace of ideas. I know that my brothers and sisters
from the civil liberties community are having chills when I say that. But
I do think that this pledge, contextualized to tie our legal analysis into
history, will save us from going down the path of unbridled government
power and unbridled censorship. Hate speech directed against Jews and
Blacks in particular-we've gone through this issue. We don't need to
keep re-resolving it. We need to look at the emerging international stan-
dards, the human rights covenants, that have rejected the idea of racist
speech." We need to look at development in the Anglo-American legal
tradition that leaves the United States alone in the refusal to have any
response to racial hate speech, and we need to say, this type of speech is
uniquely harmful. We have progressed enough as a human race that we
can reject this kind of speech out of hand.
It's useful to compare Marxist-Leninist speech, which is the other
type of speech that is so stigmatized and vulnerable to censorship, to
understand why the two are different. Marxist-Leninist speech, I would
55. See, eg., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by United Nations
GeneralAssembly December 16, 1966, art. 20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178 (entered into force March 23,
1976) (stating that "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."); International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 4 opened for signature March 7, 1966, art. 4, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, 218-19 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) (stating that "[s]tate Parties... [s]hall declare
an offense punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred .... "),
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posit, is political speech. It goes to the means for distributing wealth and
power in the community, to the form of political process, and to the form
of government we want. There is no consensus on this planet either ac-
cepting or rejecting that type of speech. We are still in the collective pro-
cess of deciding what we think about that idea. In contrast, there is no
country left on this planet that asserts racial superiority as its national
position. Even South Africa is not using white supremacy as a justifica-
tion for apartheid. Instead, it's using other types of arguments, one.step
at a time, the need for a peaceful transition of government, the need to
protect the rights of minorities.
We don't need to fight another war or see another Holocaust to con-
vince us of this truth. By narrowly setting aside racist hate speech as one
type of speech to which we will allow a limited legal response, we can
recognize first amendment values and still recognize other important
constitutional values: freedom of access, equality, personhood, freedom
to travel, freedom to enjoy all the benefits-including the economic bene-
fits-of life in this society. The principal of equality and substantive due
process is recognized when we start making the very difficult-it's not
going to be easy-the very difficult balance. I would suggest, in addition,
an interpretive rule that says, when there is doubt, side with free speech
and against censorship.
If any of you have seen this stuff, it is ugly, and I don't think we
have any problem putting in a corner this most egregious kind of racist
speech. To give you another example from my own experience, the last
time I spoke publicly on this issue, I received hate mail. That represents a
form of censorship. I'd like to publish some of these ideas in the popular
press, because I think they're ideas that should be debated in public. But
I've made a tentative decision not to, because I would receive threats
against my person. And at this point, I'm not willing to take that risk.
That's another way in which first amendment values are implicated. I
feel censored in expressing these views because of the network of racial
terrorism that's going on in this country. And it is a network. These are
not isolated incidents. The kinds of anti-Semitic statements that I'm see-
ing in my community in Hawaii, where there is no sizeable Jewish popu-
lation, can only be the result of a national network. So again, I think first
amendment values are implicated.
My time is almost up, but I just wanted to mention a few hard cases
that I think helped me develop my thinking in this area. The first hard
case is the case of the angry nationalist. What do you do about hate
speech that comes from an experience of oppression? Some Black nation-
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alists' speech might be an example. One that I'm familiar with from my
community is a Native Hawaiian woman who, in response to the fact of
genocide against Native Hawaiians, wrote a poem expressing her hatred
and anger at white women for what has happened. 6 If there is any legal
limitation of racist hate speech, it should not apply to hate speech that
comes from an experience of oppression. Again, to develop an interpreta-
tion around that area, you would need a consciousness of history.
The second hard case is the social pseudoscientist who posits some
kind of racial inferiority theory, but does it in a scientific way-empirical
evidence, IQs, and no language of persecution, degradation, or hatred. I
find that kind of speech offensive, but I wouldn't criminalize it or create
an action for damages against it, because of the absence of the language
of hatred and persecution. It moves away from the worst case type of
speech we need to limit.
We can start to develop a jurisprudence, and lawyers know how to
do this. To create exceptions, narrow interpretations, means of using the
law to limit hate speech without opening the floodgates of censorship.
We've done it in other areas, we've done it with commercial speech, defa-
mation, and other kinds of speech. Let's think about attacking racism
through the law by creating a legal response to this worst-case type of
hate speech. It's not easy and I commend those of you at this university
who are struggling with these ideas. My presentation is a tentative one
and I would welcome critical response from the audience and from the
other commentators. I think we need to work through these ideas as a
group. Thank you.
Robert Berger: Thank you Mari. And now, we'll hear from David
Goldberger.
David Goldberger: The starting point for my comments is the fairly
simple proposition that all political speech should be protected. That
would include political speech that is racist. It would include political
speech that covers matters of sex, you name it. It excludes one-on-one
insults in the work setting, discrimination in the form of workplace har-
assment which is essentially condoned by the employer who is aware of it
or allows it to be perpetuated.
How do I make this message palatable? How do I make it convinc-
ing? Trying to sell offensive communication, trying to sell freedom for
racists, is not my idea of trying to sell a popular idea. Perhaps I can get
you thinking. It's easier to say, it's bad, it's nasty, and we should do away
56. Trask, Racist White Woman, 36 BAMBOO RIDGE 87 (1987).
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with it, because if we took a straw poll of any group, a majority of people
would say, yes, let's do away with it. That's why it's dealt with in the Bill
of Rights, which is a counter-majoritarian portion of the United States
Constitution designed to limit the freedom of the majority to decide
whether or not communication should be restricted.
Let me sketch the following scenario. Let's assume Congress has the
power to pass Canada's Section 177, prohibiting the spreading of false
news. I select Section 177 because it is the basis for the Canadian prose-
cution of Ernst Zundel for publishing a book which claims that there was
no Holocaust.17 George Bush is president. Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall resign because of ill health. Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner
of the Seventh Circuit are named to the United States Supreme Court.
Roe v. Wade is completely overturned. Congress and the states pass laws
prohibiting abortion, defining individual abortion as murder and multiple
abortion as genocide. Pro-choicers advocate that abortion is not murder,
that women should do whatever they have to in order to obtain abor-
tions, that the fetus is not a person, and that the right-to-life movement is
comprised of terrorists and thugs. The people who engage in this advo-
cacy are prosecuted on the theory that they are spreading false news in
violation of my hypothetical Section 177, which makes it illegal to circu-
late untruthful statements about vulnerable minorities. In this case, Con-
gress has defined minorities to be innocent fetuses and those people
whose religion teaches that a fetus is a person. If you take the approach
of the Canadian Constitution, the pro-abortion advocates should be con-
victed. Oh yes, you can say, but we're going to construe Section 177 very
narrowly to avoid such an outcome. But the only reason that you're go-
ing to construe it more narrowly is that you want to, not because you
have a principle that explains why it should be construed more narrowly.
If, indeed, abortion is murder, if mass abortion is genocide, then it only
follows that advocacy of such murder and of genocide can be prohibited
under provisions like Section 177.
Now you could say that my scenario can't happen. But it seems to
me that some of you are already wondering whether it will happen. To
explain why it can happen, you have to make some other assumptions
which are inherent in the arguments about the Canadian constitutional
provisions that appear to justify censorship of racist communication. One
of the assumptions is, the political branches of government can be trusted
to make sound decisions about regulating advocacy of unlawful conduct
57. See R. v. Zundel, supra note 7.
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and communications concerning racism. But the government regulation
of abortion-related speech is thought to help prevent abortion; if you
want to prohibit abortion enough, you can easily justify censorship of the
advocacy of abortion. You also have to assume that the government is
making decisions based on the general welfare, rather than a desire to
please an influential political constituency. Finally, you can go even fur-
ther by making the assumption that the people who advocate abortion
are advocating murder and are therefore a social menace.
The real difficulty with criminalizing the political rantings of racists
is the same as criminalizing advocacy of abortion. It is not clear that the
purpose is related to protecting against palpable harm. It is just as likely
that we criminalize the political rantings of racists to appease the rage
that we all feel toward the speakers. Stomping on them makes us feel
better. They're bad people, and we want to do something about it. The
censorship laws that we are talking about today are not limited to cases
where there is provable and palpable harm in the individual circum-
stance. We have heard that there is a generalized, automatic harm when-
ever those awful things are said. I'm prepared to accept that assumption
in a face-to-face verbal confrontation. I'm prepared to accept that as-
sumption in the workplace. I'm not prepared to accept that assumption
for the a soap box speaker. I'm not prepared to accept that assumption
from the passing of leaflets. Yes, there is a pain in those circumstances.
Yes, we feel ugly. Some of the leaflets that I've seen in the course of
representing some clients make you sick to your stomach, but it is, in my
view, a harm or an effect which we should not criminalize.
Think of this hypothetical which happens unfortunately in all too
many American households. Assume it in your own household. The
spouse whom you thought was a loving, true, and loyal spouse tells you
that he or she is going to leave you for your best friend, that he or she has
always regarded you as worthless and your best friend as something ter-
rific. Not exactly a communication designed to warm your heart. In fact,
it is very damaging. Any psychiatrist will tell you the impact of that
communication is devastating. We do not criminalize it. Yes, some juris-
dictions have laws of criminal conversation. Yes, some jurisdictions have
laws in which you can sue the meddler in the relationship. But in this day
and age, many states have abolished those laws. Few enforce them. It is
an injury that we accept as part of our everyday life.
The criminalization-and this is a point which Mr. Borovoy made
very effectively-the criminalization of the kind of racist communication
that we all find offensive has never been an effective weapon against ra-
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cism. If we make it illegal, the racists will do one of two things: they will
either continue to communicate that way and hope they are prosecuted,
because they say a few months in jail is well worth the publicity; or alter-
natively, they will be driven underground where we can't see them to get
at them.
My view is that political speech is the centerpiece of the democracy.
I do share that First Amendment Romanticism, but I don't believe that
everything I've said is romantic. The suppression of racist and offensive
political communication in the political marketplace is not going to ac-
complish what many of you believe it will, and it is romantic to think
otherwise. Thank you very much.
Robert Berger: Thank you. And now, our final speaker will be Barry
Brown.
Barry Brown: Thank you for inviting me here. As the only non-
lawyer on the panel, I feel in a bit of a minority group myself, so it's
going to be interesting to address this issue from that point of view. I was
not invited here, of course, to debate the fine points of law. I have distin-
guished colleagues on the panel who have done that well. I was invited
here because I am a reporter, and as a reporter, I am supposed to be
against censorship. Therefore, I should be against the hate laws. Well, I
am against censorship, very strongly. But I am in favor of these laws as a
legislative tool to support the foundations and principles of Canadian
democracy.
Before I begin my main argument, though, I would like to offer a
few observations about differing perspectives in the U.S. and Canada on
how different points of view are perceived politically. For example, I un-
derstand that Education Secretary Bennett has called the people at this
distinguished university a bunch of radical communists for trying to en-
force the laws to restrict hate mongering. I feel sorry for you! In my own
experience as a freelance journalist, I was talking to an editor in Tennes-
see about selling him a story, and I was told that my question about
whether this story would be acceptable should be directed to the person
who was the owner, publisher, and executive editor of this paper. After
telling me this man's name, he also cautioned me that I should be careful
about it because this man was really "left wing." As a Canadian, of
course, I immediately thought the man must be a card-carrying member
of Canada's socialists, the New Democratic Party. So I asked, how left
wing is he? And the man on the other end of the phone said, well, he
believes in things like human rights.
In my talk, while I will obviously refer to law, I will focus mostly on
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my own understanding, as a citizen and as a reporter, of what living in
Canadian society is about and how these laws work as part of the Cana-
dian experience. First, I'll respond to some of the points that have been
made here. Barring hate-mongering speech really should be no different
than regulating other types of speech and activity, which do not require a
clear and present danger to maintain society's long-term goals and objec-
tives. For example, along with yelling "FIRE" in a crowded theatre, in
Canada it is also illegal to identify by name rape victims and juvenile
offenders, or to point out that certain evidence came from a wire tap.
Controls are placed on how often and when and where we can hunt and
fish, how fast we can drive, and what level of insurance we must carry
when we drive a car. Controls are placed on the chemicals we use in the
environment and upon ourselves. All of this is a mandate of government,
with the force of the law behind it. We make it stick, and try to apply it
fairly. Now some may say that this comparison is highly questionable.
Let's make it clear. The Canadian law does not restrict thought. You can
sit with any number of your friends and tell as many race jokes as you
feel like telling. It only comes into effect when you try to incite hatred.
That is the difference.
I'd like to offer some of my thoughts on the law itself, and then
carry on to the larger observation about the Canadian and American
democratic traditions. The first point to consider is that these laws do not
restrict a principle as much as they support one. These laws support Sec-
tions 15 and 27 of Canada's Charter of Rights of Freedom. Section 15
reads, "Every individual is equal before and unto the law and has the
right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimina-
tion, and in particular without discrimination based on race and national
or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or natural or physical disabil-
ity." 8 Any law made to help the disadvantaged in any of these groups
will not be considered a violation of this section. Section 27 of the Char-
ter directs the judicial interpretation of the Charter to enhance the mul-
ticultural heritage of Canadians. 9 Canada's hate propaganda law and
the spreading of falsehood law' protect people against the inhuman vio-
lence that is hate, because hate is rooted in one western vice, insensitivity
to the sufferings of others.
People here have discussed the attitude of hate in a legal context.
I'm not a lawyer. I'm not going to do that. I'm going to tell you my view
58. See Charter, s. 15(1), 15(2).
59. See Charter, s. 27.
60. See supra notes 2, 24-29 and accompanying text.
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on hate, just as a person in society. Hate and bigotry against identifiable
groups-not to incite and disturb people, but hate as bigotry-is not like
other political views. It isn't Libertarian or Communist, it isn't sedition
or revolution or anarchy. Hate is the oldest, most destructive human re-
action. And it's predicated on destruction-permanent destruction-be-
cause hate cannot exist without the component to destroy. It's one group
against another, destroying the value of each society together.
Among the values that support these laws is the maintenance of
trust. I submit to you that extremism reaps extremism and moderation
follows security. Commenting as an observer and not as a statistician, it
seems that the rise of militant ethnic groups is the direct result of insecu-
rity within and distrust of the state's commitment and ability to protect
them. For example, when the United States Supreme Court allowed the
American Nazi Party, with apologies to my fellow panelists here, to
march in a suburb of Chicago known as Skokie where many Holocaust
survivors live,61 it undoubtedly brought new members to the Jewish De-
fense League. These new members were probably convinced with argu-
ments that ran like this: if society is not going to protect us from racial
attack now, why would they protect us if these madmen ever came to
power? And if you doubt that interpretation, consider the League's slo-
gan: "We are talking about Jewish survival." Extremism breeds extrem-
ism. I'm not trying to single out the Jewish Defense League here. The
same holds true for all groups who feel threatened. So the question be-
comes, how do we preserve social trust while encouraging both civility
and radical dissent?
Before coming down here, I was given some readings on the subject
of hate propaganda law. One article by American law professor Leon
Friedman was titled Freedom of Speech: Should It Be Available to
Pornographers, Nazis and the Klan?62 Leaving aside pornographers for
the moment, Friedman presents a classic first amendment argument
based on the absolutist interpretation of freedom of speech that we've
heard here today. His argument, in sum, is that while we understand the
pain and suffering of minority groups, we allow hate mongering for the
good of all minority groups and for society as a whole. The essential
reasoning of his argument, I believe, can be found in a quote he offers
from Justice Robert Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, "[E]very person must
61. See supra note 44.
62. Friedman, Freedom of Speech: Should It Be Available to Pornographers, Nazis, and the
Klan?, in GROUP DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (M. Freedman ed., expected publication
1990).
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be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any
government to separate the true and false for us."63 With all due respect
to Justice Jackson and Professor Friedman, the government already sep-
arates truth from falsehood in advertising laws and in the very existence
of courts and, I submit, universities. The role of government I will ad-
dress later.
As a Canadian, I found some curious turns of logic in Friedman's
argument. He says, for instance, that the Scandinavian countries and
England can't afford group defamation laws because they are not as di-
verse or as divided as Americans. Their social compact is a different one.
He writes, "Their laws teach the need for civility in a society with far less
tension and group oppression than ours. The need for a hands-on atti-
tude among pluralistic groups does not exist in the same way."' 64 First of
all, he neglected to include Canada in his list of countries which can't
afford those laws. Presumably, this is because his argument that America
is unique as a pluralistic society would go out the window. He also notes
that these societies are more tolerant and civil without giving much
thought to whether the existence of the hate laws or anti-hate laws en-
courages that tolerance and civility. He also fails to show why a hands-off
attitude is necessary in a multicultural society, unless his argument is
that tolerance and sympathy are not worthwhile goals except when
achieved by an accident of history. Friedman goes on to say that it is
comforting to walk down a street in America knowing that you cannot
be arrested for anything that you say. But leaving aside for the moment
the patent falsity of the latter part of that statement, I turn your attention
to the comfort factor. Mr. Friedman may feel theoretically comfortable
walking down an American city street at night, but in practice, walking
down a street in Toronto at night is much more comforting. Especially
when encountering different ethnic and racial groups.
When these hate laws were first proposed, the Canadian Civil Liber-
ties Association said they would lead to horrible abuse. They predicted
Adolph Hitler's Mein Kampf and books by angry activists like Eldridge
Cleaver's Soul on Ice and Alan Paton's Cry the Beloved Country would be
considered hate literature and forced from the shelves. However, those
books and others with similar themes are still available in Canada. In
fact, the law has been applied less than 'a dozen times in the eighteen
years since it has been enacted, which is hardly rampant censorship. But
that should not be surprising, since these laws were not designed as a tool
63. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945)).
64. Id.
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for censorship. They were crafted to uphold society's commitment to tol-
erance, to be used only with the consent of the attorney general.
But what is the alternative to not having the law? The alternative is
not, to people like James Keegstra and Ernst Zundel, to simply live quiet
hate-filled lives with other quiet hate-filled people. The alternative is that
racist groups will get television shows on cable stations like the Ku Klux
Klan ads in the United States, shows which will allow them to preach
their message of hate under the guise of a freedom they don't believe in.
Racists thrive on lies because racism is a lie. They don't care about the
truth.
Somebody brought up Geraldo Rivera earlier knowing I was going
to mention this. We've all heard about the program with the white su-
premacist that turned into a brawl. Well, on an earlier show, he had on,
as his guests, people who were themselves talk show hosts, from T.V. and
radio stations across the United States. When the discussion turned to
hate mongers, they all agreed on some essential points. The first was, the
views of hate mongers should be aired so that they could be refuted. And
the second was, membership in the hate mongers groups increased after
each of these shows. In our society, it's said, results are all that matters.
Milton said, "Let [truth] and falsehood grapple, who ever knew [t]ruth
put to the worse, in a free and open encounter."6 But I would take issue
with that statement and with the sentiment behind it, because anyone
who believes that the truth cannot be put to the worse in a free and open
encounter has never worked in politics, the media, advertising, and cer-
tainly never in the law. Hate mongers are not sitting out there waiting to
be the punching bag for liberal tolerant values. They are out there to sell
their message. And in the emotional selling game of politics, only three
things count: television, television, television.
This brings me to another point. The old saying, "If you want to
send a message, try Western Union" is fraud. Every story has a message.
The only difference is whether the message was supported by the status
quo. To tie the two points together, consider this. When society's media
are given over to hate mongers, sales are inevitably made. So how each
country approaches this decision speaks to the essence of each nation,
our values and structures.
Going back to Friedman for a moment, he interprets the American
social contract as, we won't gang up on you with our laws, our courts,
65. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in II COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN
MILTON 485, 561 (E. Sirluck ed. 1959) (modem spellings used).
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and you won't gang up on us for anything we say. Friedman accepts that
there are automatic advantages to being, say, a white-skinned, Christian
in our society. He accepts this as normal, as he does the prejudices that
he feels will inevitably follow. But in accepting this as normal, he dis-
misses the reality, which is that any attack is far more effective in condi-
tioning our responses to and expectations of minority groups than
anything the minority groups can offer in rebuttal. In the 1960s a psy-
chology experiment showed that Black children were more likely to
ascribe positive qualities to White dolls than with Black ones, because of
the image of the Black people they saw on television and in the movies.
Repeating these messages over and over again can lead to a downward
cycle, where lowering expectations becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Yet, Friedman virtually encourages ethnic counter-militancy by admit-
ting it is the only way that he can think of to overcome that inherent
disadvantage. When the courts are turned to for justice, he offers only
uncontrolled rhetoric and equally intolerant ethnic groups to replace
them.
The Canadian approach, however, is different. Sir Winston Church-
ill once said that England and the United States were two countries that
are separated by a common language. Well, to paraphrase Churchill, the
first thing to understand about Canada and the United States is that we
are two countries that are separated by a common democratic tradition.
In the melting pot culture of the United States, some people consider it
easy to attack others for not being American enough. In multicultural
Canada, there is no such concept as, I'm a Canadian. Some people say,
how can you be a country if everyone has a multinational self-image, if
everyone is a French-Canadian or English-Canadian or Indian-Canadian
or whatever? But that multiculturalism is exactly what Canada is about.
Comparing Canada and the United States is like comparing a mo-
saic to a painting. Like the United States, we are a country born of demo-
cratic principles, not demographics. But the North American
experiments have taken two different paths. Canadians, it's well known,
are a cautious lot. Canadian society itself is described as evolutionary,
not revolutionary. America's revolutionary society, it often appears, fo-
cuses on the notion that only the survivor is right. Hence, the argument
that the best way is to let every man fight it out, and may the best idea
win. However, the evolutionary principle is one of consensual change, of
sensitivity and compromise, and the hate laws are a pillar of that princi-
ple. The absolute right to be a racist in public appears to be American.
Before I go on, I would like to make it clear that I don't think of Canada
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as perfect. We have prejudice and justice and nationalism, even as
America has socially concerned citizens determined to insure tolerance.
Let me turn to the question of maintaining democracy. I won't com-
pare Canada and the United States directly. Both countries are healthy
democracies. Therefore, the issue should not be treated as one of freedom
of speech. It should be seen as a question of human rights--everyone's
rights, and how you can best protect them. These laws are not there just
to protect minorities. These laws are the will of the majority, of society as
a whole. We are repulsed by these ideas and we will not sanction them.
Laws can be proactive without diminishing freedom. That is why the
hate laws are specifically used before a physical attack on a person or
property occurs. The laws were made with extreme care and used with
even greater care. Thank you very much.
Robert Berger: I thank our speakers for a most stimulating discus-
sion. All of us, I am sure, have been forced to reconsider this issue as a
result of these forceful presentations of divergent views. The talks today
have demonstrated that there is room for serious debate on this question,
and that this debate can be enhanced by considering the question in the
context of two similar-but as shown today, perhaps quite different-
democracies.
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